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Abstract
This paper analyzes the risk attitude and investment behavior of a group of heterogeneous
consumers who face an uninsurable background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion
at the individual level does not imply standard risk aversion at the group level under e¢ cient
risk sharing. This points to a potential divergence between individual and collective portfolio
choices in the presence of background risk. We show that if the members absolute risk
tolerance is increasing and satises a strong form of concavity, then the group has standard
risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that people are more reluctant to
invest in risky assets when they face other sources of uninsurable and undesirable background
risk (e.g., labor income risk).1 In a seminal paper, Kimball (1993) shows that an expected-utility
maximizer with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence
(DAP) will have this type of response to background risk. The combination of DARA and
DAP is referred to as standard risk aversion. In the present study, we ask whether a group
of diverse individuals, who share risks e¢ ciently among themselves and make joint investment
decisions, will respond to background risk in the same way. Specically, we want to identify the
conditions under which the groups preferences (or aggregate utility function) exhibit standard
risk aversion.
It is known that if all members have DARA preferences, then the aggregate utility function
will have the same property.2 However, this is not true in general for DAP, as we will show below.
In other words, standard risk aversion at the individual level is not enough to ensure standard
risk aversion at the group level under an e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement. One implication is
that a group of standard-risk-averse individuals under such arrangement may choose to increase
their exposure to risky assets in the presence of background risk. A specic example is shown
in Section 3. In this paper, we ask the question: under what conditions will collective portfolio
choices under background risk be consistent with individual choices? Our main result shows that
if each individual members absolute risk tolerance is increasing and satises a strong form of
concavity (which implies DAP) then the aggregate utility function is standard. This result has
two other implications on the groups preferences. Firstly, since standard risk aversion implies
proper risk aversion and risk vulnerability, our result ensures that the groups preferences will
have these properties.3 Secondly, DAP implies that the aggregate utility function has a negative
fourth derivative.4 Apps et al. (2014) show that this property is not guaranteed in general even
if all the membersutility function have negative fourth derivative.
1See, for instance, Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Palia et al. (2014) for empirical evidence.
2See, for instance, Hara et al. (2007, p.656) for a formal statement of this result.
3The notions of proper risk aversionand risk vulnerabilityare introduced by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)
and Gollier and Pratt (1996), respectively.
4This property is often referred to as temperance.See, Kimball (1992) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)
for more discussion on this property.
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2 The Model
Consider a static model with a group made up of N individuals, N being an integer greater
than one. The group has a sure amount of initial wealth W > 0; which can be invested in two
assets: a safe asset with a riskless rate of return r > 0 and a risky asset with a random rate of
return eR: Let  and W    denote, respectively, the amount of risky and safe investment. The
gross return from this portfolio is given by
(W   ) (1 + r) + 

1 + eR = ! + ex;
where !  W (1 + r) > 0 and ex  eR  r is the excess return from the risky asset. The random
variable ex is drawn from a compact interval X  R according to some probability distribution.
Apart from the risky investment, the group also faces an exogenous, uninsurable background
risk ey in nal wealth. The background risk is drawn from a compact interval Y  R; it can
take both positive and negative values and is statistically independent of ex:5 The probability
distributions of ex and ey are known to all group members, so there is no disagreement in their
probabilistic beliefs. The sum of investment returns and background risk is used to nance the
membersconsumption. The group as a whole thus faces the following budget constraint:
NX
i=1
eci  ! + ex+ ey; (1)
where eci denotes member is consumption. Each members preferences can be represented by
E [ui (eci)] ; for i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng : The utility function ui : R+ ! R is at least ve times di¤eren-
tiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satises the Inada condition lim
c!0
u0i (c) =1:
We focus on e¢ cient decisions made by the group. Specically, the members of the group col-
lectively decide on a level of risky investment () and an allocation of consumption (ec1;ec2; :::;ecN )
5One example of such background risk is household earnigs risk. In particular, a positive value of ey can be
interpreted as a positive deviation in household earnings from its expected value. This can be the result of a
promotion or bonus. On the other hand, a negative value (or negative deviation from the mean) can be the result
of a layo¤. The independence assumption is commonly used in the background risk literature [e.g., Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993) and Gollier and Pratt (1996), among many others]. It is also consistent with
the empirical evidence reported in Palia et al. (2014, Table 2). There is a burgeoning literature that considers
intrahousehold risk sharing in the presence of uninsurable earnings risk [see, for instance, Mazzocco (2007) and
Ortigueira and Siassi (2013)].
3
so as to maximize a weighted sum of their expected utility, i.e.,
NX
i=1
iE [ui (eci)] ;
where i > 0 is the Pareto weight for member i; subject to (1) and eci  0 for all i: This problem
can be divided into two parts: First, conditional on  and the realization of (ex; ey) ; the group
solves a resources allocation problem:
bu (z)  max
fec1;:::;ecNg
NX
i=1
iui (eci) ; (2)
subject to
NX
i=1
eci  z  ! + ex+ ey; and eci  0 for all i:
For any z > 0; the constraint set of the above problem is compact. This, together with a
continuous and strictly concave objective function, ensures the existence of a unique solution.
The Inada condition ensures that each optimal eci is strictly positive. By the maximum theorem,
the aggregate utility function bu () is continuous and each optimal eci can be determined by a
continuous function i (z) ; known as the sharing rule. By the implicit function theorem, if each
ui () is (m+ 1) times di¤erentiable, then both i () and bu () are m times di¤erentiable. Thus,
under our stated assumptions, both i () and bu () are at least four times di¤erentiable. In
addition, bu () is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The second part of the group problem is to choose the level of risky investment, i.e.,
max

E [bu (! + ex+ ey)] : (3)
Since the optimal choice of all eci must be strictly positive, the group must choose  so that
z  ! + ex + ey is strictly positive for all possible realizations of (ex; ey) : Depending on the
boundary values of X and Y; this can allow for short-selling of the risky asset (i.e.,  < 0) or
short-selling of the safe asset (i.e.,  > W ). Since the objective function in (3) is continuous
and strictly concave in , a unique solution (denoted by ) exists.
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3 Standard Risk Aversion of bu
For each member i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; dene Ai (c)   u00i (c) =u0i (c) as the measure of absolute
risk aversion and Pi (c)   u000i (c) =u00i (c) as the measure of absolute prudence. The reciprocal
of Ai (c) ; denoted by Ti (c) ; is the measure of absolute risk tolerance. The rst derivative of
Ti (c) is referred to as absolute cautiousness [see Wilson (1968)]. Since bu () is at least four
times di¤erentiable, we can dene the corresponding measures, bA (z) ; bT (z) and bP (z) ; for the
aggregate utility function. Wilson (1968) shows that there is a close connection between Ti (c),bT (z) and i (z) : Specically,
0i (z) =
Ti [i (z)]bT (z) > 0 for all i; and (4)
bT (z) = NX
i=1
Ti [i (z)] : (5)
Di¤erentiating both sides of (5) with respect to z gives
bT 0 (z) = NX
i=1
0i (z)T
0
i [i (z)] : (6)
Since
PN
i=1 
0
i (z) = 1; the absolute cautiousness of bu () can be viewed as a weighted average of
the individualsabsolute cautiousness (evaluated under the sharing rule).
We now consider the e¤ect of background risk on the groups investment decision. Note that
the portfolio choice problem in (3) is no di¤erent from the one faced by a single decision-maker
(normative representative agent) with utility function bu () : Thus, according to the variant of
Proposition 6 in Kimball (1993, p.610), any independent background risk ey that raises the
representative agents expected marginal utility under the optimal choice ; i.e.,
E
bu0 (! + ex+ ey)  E bu0 (! + ex) ; (7)
will lower the absolute value of  if and only if bu () exhibits standard risk aversion, i.e., when
both bA () and bP () are decreasing functions.
From (4) and (5), it is obvious that if Ti () is an increasing function (or equivalently, Ai ()
is a decreasing function) for all i; then bA () must be decreasing. The relation between Pi () andbP () is examined in Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1 The representative agents absolute prudence is given by
bP (z)  NX
i=1

0i (z)
2
Pi [i (z)] ; (8)
with rst derivative
bP 0 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
3
P 0i [i (z)] +
2h bT (z)i2
NX
i=1
0i (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o2 : (9)
Proof of Lemma 1 Di¤erentiating Ti (c)   u0i (c) =u00i (c) with respect to c gives T 0i (c) =
 1+Ti (c)Pi (c) for all c > 0: The counterpart for bu () is bT 0 (z) =  1+ bT (z) bP (z) for all z > 0:
Substituting these questions into (6), and using
PN
i=1 
0
i (z) = 1 gives
bT (z) bP (z) = NX
i=1
0i (z)Ti [i (z)]Pi [i (z)] :
Equation (8) follows immediately by rearranging terms and applying (4). Next, di¤erentiating
(8) with respect to z gives
bP 0 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
3
P 0i [i (z)] + 2
NX
i=1
0i (z)
00
i (z)Pi [i (z)] :
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to z gives
00i (z) =
0i (z)bT (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o :
Equation (9) can be obtained by combining the last two equations. 
Equation (9) shows that the rst derivative of bP () can be decomposed into two parts:
The rst part captures the e¤ects of P 0i () on bP 0 () : In particular, this term is negative if
all group members have decreasing absolute prudence. The second term captures the ef-
fects due to the heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness across group members. Since bT 0 (z)
is the weighted average of fT 0i [i (z)]gNi=1 under the set of weights f0i (z)gNi=1 ; the expressionPN
i=1 
0
i (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o2 is the variance of absolute cautiousness among the group mem-
bers, which is always positive. Thus, even if all members have DAP preferences, the represen-
tative agent may not. In this case, it is possible to nd fex; eyg such that the group will increase
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Figure 1: An Example of Non-monotonic bP () :
their risky investment in the presence of background risk. This is demonstrated in the following
example.
Consider two individuals with preferences u1 (c) = 1  1 exp ( c) and u2 (c) =
 
c1    1 = (1  ) ;
with  > 0 and  > 0: Both individuals exhibit (weakly) decreasing absolute risk aversion and
(weakly) decreasing absolute prudence. When acting alone, the rst agents choice of  is unaf-
fected by any background risk that satises (7), while the second agent will reduce his/her risky
investment. Suppose now the two form an e¢ cient risk-sharing group and suppose 1 = 1:5;
2 = 1:0;  = 0:1 and  = 0:4: The resulting bP (z) ; as depicted in Figure 1, is non-monotonic
and strictly increasing when z is small. Take ! = 4:5 and suppose ex has only two possible
states, -0.2 and 0.24, with equal probability. In the absence of any background risk, the couples
optimal choice of risky investment is 1 = 5:093: Suppose now we introduce a background riskey, which can take three possible values: -2.0, 0 and 2.6, with equal probability.6 In the presence
of ey, the couple will increase their risky investment to 2 = 5:105:
The results in our Lemma 1 are closely related to those in Hara et al. (2007, Section
4). Specically, these authors show that e¢ cient risk sharing has a tendency to make bT (z) a
6Condition (7) is satised under this ey and 1: The detail of this and other parts of the example are shown in
a Technical Appendix available from the authors personal website. In this appendix, we show that similar results
[i.e., a non-monotonic bP () and 2 > 1] can be obtained under other values of f1; ; g :
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convex function and increase the slope of bT (z) =z: Thus, even if all group members have concave
absolute risk tolerance or increasing relative risk aversion (which is equivalent to a decreasing
Ti (c) =c), the representative agent may not have these characteristics. The concavity of bT () is
of particular interest here due to the following observation.7
Lemma 2 If bT () is increasing concave, then bP () is decreasing and bu () is standard.
Lemma 2 suggests one way to establish the standardness of bu () : The remaining question is
under what conditions will bT () be a concave function. Hara et al. (2007) have already shown
that it is not enough to have a concave Ti () for all i: This prompts us to consider a stronger form
of concavity, which is the notion of -concavityas discussed in Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991).
For any  2 [ 1;1] ; a nonnegative function g () is called -concave if the transformed
function eg (x)  [g (x)] = is concave. Since g () and eg () are equivalent when  = 1; the usual
notion of concavity corresponds to the case of  = 1:8 In general, if g () is 1-concave, then
it is also 2-concave for all 2  1: If both g () and eg () are twice di¤erentiable, then g () is
-concave if and only if
g (x) g00 (x)  (1  ) g0 (x)2 ; for all x:
The main result of this paper is to show that if each group members absolute risk tolerance is
-concave, for some   2; then the representative agents absolute risk tolerance is a concave
function. This result holds regardless of whether Ti () is monotonic. It follows that if each
Ti () is increasing and -concave, for some   2; then bT () is increasing concave and bu () is
standard.9
Theorem 3 Suppose for each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; Ti () is -concave, for some   2; then bT () is
a concave function. If, in addition, each Ti () is increasing, then bu () is standard.
Proof of Theorem 3 As shown in Theorem 4 of Hara et al. (2007), the second derivative ofbT (z) can be expressed as
bT 00 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
2
T 00i [i (z)] +
1bT (z)
NX
i=1
0i (z)T
0
i [i (z)]
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o :
7This result has appeared in Gollier (2001b, p.166). Its proof follows immediately by noting that bP (z) > 0;bT (z) > 0 and bT 00 (z) = bT 0 (z) bP (z) + bT (z) bP 0 (z) for all z > 0:
8Quasi-concavity and logconcavity of g () correspond, respectively, to the cases of  =  1 and  = 0:
9 If Ti () is increasing and -concave for some   2; then it is increasing and concave in the usual sense. Thus,
by Lemma 2, ui () has standard risk aversion.
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Using (4) and (6), we can rewrite this as
bT 00 (z) = 1bT (z)
NX
i=1

0i (z)
 n
T 00i [i (z)]Ti [i (z)] +
 
T 0i [i (z)]
2o 
h bT 0 (z)i2bT (z) :
Thus, it su¢ ce to show that T 00i (c)Ti (c) + [T
0
i (c)]
2  0 for all c  0 and for all i: If Ti () is
-concave for some   2; then we have T 00i (c)Ti (c)  (1  ) [T 0i (c)]2 ; which implies
T 00i (c)Ti (c) +

T 0i (c)
2  (2  ) T 0i (c)2  0:
This completes the proof. 
In the economics literature, the assumption of -concavity is typically imposed on the density
function of some distributions.10 To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study that
applies this type of concavity to characterize risk preferences. Suppose individualsabsolute risk
tolerance takes a power form as in Gollier (2001a, p.189), i.e., Ti (c) = ici ; for some constants
i > 0 and i  0: Then Ti (c) is -concave for some   2 if and only if i  0:5:
10For instance, Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) impose this assumption on the distribution of voterscharacteristics
in a voting model; Ewerhart (2013) applies this on the distribution of bidderscharacteristics in auction models.
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